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Local natural resource management in its diverse manifestations holds core to its
principles that the marginal and vulnerable households are empowered to manage
valuable natural resources to improve social and economic equality and conserve
biodiversity. Yet studies aiming to identify the impacts often show inconsistent
results. Through constructing an integrated Environmental and Social Accounting
Matrix (ESAM), we aim to assess how natural resources are used in different sectors
and by different livelihoods, thus delivering different direct and indirect benefits
to the community. The study was conducted in Namibia’s Sikunga Conservancy,
which manages wildlife and fish resources in the Zambezi region. Our village-level
ESAM shows an economic structure that strongly disadvantages remote households
and identifies a small sector of the economy that benefits significantly from the use
of natural resources. The ESAM approach is able to isolate undesirable socioeco-
nomic developments such as unequal benefit sharing, which hinders community
development.
Keywords
community-based natural resource management, multiplier analysis,
village economy, Namibia, social accounting matrix
Journal of Environment &
Development
2016, Vol. 25(4) 396–425
! The Author(s) 2016
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1070496516664385
jed.sagepub.com
1Institute of Environmental Economics and World Trade, Leibniz University of Hannover, Hannover,
Germany
Corresponding Author:
Huon Morton, Institute of Environmental Economics and World Trade, Leibniz University of Hannover,
Ko¨nigsworther Platz 1, Hannover, Lower Saxony 30167, Germany.
Email: morton@iuw.uni-hannover.de
Local natural resource management (NRM) concepts, namely, community-
based natural resource management (CBNRM) and comparable programs
such as ﬁsheries comanagement and community-based ﬁsheries management
continue to gather momentum as national decentralization and democratization
programs sweep across sub-Saharan Africa (Blaikie, 2006; Dressler et al., 2010;
Fabricius et al., 2013; Sowman & Wynberg, 2014). By transferring property
rights for natural resources, CBNRM aims to provide communities with an
increased incentive to sustainably manage the natural resources they depend
upon and at the same time deliver equitable economic growth (Berkes, 2004;
Jones & Weaver, 2008).1
Despite the popularity of the philosophy, the overall impact of CBNRM
remains unclear (Lewins et al., 2014; Riehl, Zerriﬃ, & Naidoo, 2015; Silva &
Mosimane, 2012). Impacts can be measured at multiple scales; at the national
level, CBNRM programs appear to be having a positive impact throughout sub-
Saharan Africa. Increases in wildlife headcounts (Roe, Nelson, & Sandbrook,
2009) and income (Frost & Bond, 2008; Naidoo et al., 2016) have been recorded
in sub-Saharan countries with CBNRM. CBNRM programs have also been
found to boost economic activity in other sectors (Muchapondwa & Stage,
2013). Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) have been applied in Namibia to
analyze the impact of hunting tourism (Samuelsson & Stage, 2007) and angling
tourism (Kirchner & Stage, 2005), as well as the value of Namibia’s protected
areas (Turpie, Barnes, Lange, & Martin, 2010), with all studies showing
CBNRM helps stimulate growth in other sectors within the Namibian economy.
However, beneﬁts at national and community level may not necessarily
trickle down to individual households (Leisher et al., 2016; Nunan, 2006;
Riehl et al., 2015).
Using various quasi-experimental methods, recent studies reveal inconclusive
results. The impact of CBNRM on income has been statistically insigniﬁcant for
the average household (Pailler, Naidoo, Burgess, Freeman, & Fisher, 2015;
Riehl, 2014; Suich, 2013), whereas improvements in health (Naidoo &
Johnson, 2013; Riehl, 2014) and food security (Pailler et al., 2015) have been
identiﬁed. The question therefore remains: Why are the impacts of CBNRM
inconsistent?
One possible reason is that particular livelihoods beneﬁt more than others
from CBNRM (Collomb et al., 2008; Scanlon & Kull, 2009; Suich, 2013).
Looking primarily at the direct income and ﬁnancial aspects while neglecting
the indirect beneﬁts from conservation may present another reason why impacts
of NRM are conﬂicting (TEEB, 2012; WAVES, 2016). It is well established that
the value of natural resources within CBNRM areas far exceeds the economic
output from production and tourism (Turpie et al., 2010). Despite the economic
value of natural resources, Humavindu and Stage (2015) identiﬁed the risk of
long-term environmental sustainability due to unsustainable ﬁnancing of con-
servancies, particularly younger conservancies, which may fail to generate
Morton et al. 397
revenue to cover operating expenditure of their conservation activities. In add-
ition to waning donor funding, the challenge of sustainable ﬁnancing may partly
be explained by the fact that management committees use funds diﬀerently. As
Mulonga and Murphy (2003) highlighted, the increased cash ﬂows from
CBNRM activities can be used for multiple purposes, shared directly across
households, or invested in community funds or infrastructure. In turn, we
have seen that some sectors within CBNRM are complementary, for instance,
hunting and tourism (Naidoo et al., 2016), while others namely livestock and
agriculture are often the source of conﬂict with wildlife-focused sectors (Hoare,
2015; Kahler & Gore, 2015; Mosimane, McCool, Brown, & Ingrebretson, 2014).
As a way to enhance the discussion by analyzing how economic, ﬁnancial,
and natural resources are distributed within a nature-dependent economy, we
constructed an integrated, Environmental and Social Accounting Matrix
(ESAM). The ESAM integrates economic, ﬁnancial, and natural resources
into a single matrix. By incorporating the diﬀerent sectors, we can observe the
linkages between single activities and derive the context-speciﬁc, direct, and
indirect income eﬀects of CBNRM in our study region. Analyzing the ﬂow of
resources between actors and sectors is essentially answering “who does what
with whom, in exchange for what, by what means, for what purpose, with what
change in the stock” (United Nations, 2009, p. 16) and is key to understanding
how the economy causes diﬀerent outcomes for diﬀerent social groups.
By showing the linkages between resources and household, we answer the
following questions:
. What is the economic contribution of environment- and non-environment-
based activities to the village economy?
. What are the structural linkages between environmental and non-environ-
ment activities in the village economy?
. How is environmental income distributed across livelihoods and regions
within the village economy?
We aim to demonstrate the potential of using an ESAM to show the distribu-
tion of natural resources and their beneﬁts within a CBNRM environment.
More generally, we have constructed a multisectoral SAM at the village level,
including additional environmental accounts for selected natural resources.
The ESAM provides a consistent data framework that can ﬂexibly be
extended and used as a point of reference for economic modeling. Our ESAM
complements the few in existence from Faße, Winter, and Grote (2014);
Shiferaw and Holden (2000); and San Martin and Holden (2004). We, however,
go further and integrate multiple environmental resources within the single
ESAM. The rest of the article is set out with a brief overview of the data
for the ESAM, a detailed description of the model, and, last, the results, discus-
sion, and conclusion.
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Study Area and Data
Study Area
To demonstrate the usefulness of an ESAM in explaining the impacts of NRM,
we selected a conservancy in the Zambezi region of Namibia. The study was part
of the Southern African Science Service Centre for Climate Change and
Adaptive Land Management (SASSCAL; see, www.sasscal.org) research port-
folio on climate change and adaptive land use and took place in Sikunga
Conservancy, a developing conservancy gazetted in 2009 and hosting wildlife
as well as valuable freshwater ﬁsh resources. The Zambezi region has a high
GINI coeﬃcient and high levels of poverty (National Statistics Agency, 2012).
Although rich in biodiversity, regional environmental issues such as overﬁshing,
deforestation, slash-and-burn farming, and poaching continue to grow
(Mendelsohn, 2006; Tweddle, Cowx, Peel, & Weyl, 2015). The region is also
home to the Kavango-Zambezi (KAZA) Transfrontier Conservation Area
(TFCA) and supports a number of vulnerable wildlife but also causes serious
human–wildlife conﬂicts (Metcalfe & Kepe, 2008). Fish stocks, located yearlong
in the Zambezi river and across the ﬂoodplains during the ﬂood season, are
suﬀering from overﬁshing and a lack of coordinated management with cross-
border Zambia (Abbott et al., 2007; Tweddle et al., 2015). Grazing plains in the
Zambezi region, which support large numbers of livestock, are slowly being
eroded. Deforestation, increasing livestock headcounts, and slash-and-burn
farming have contributed to the erosion and degradation of ﬂoodplains in the
region (Purvis, 2002). Agriculture practices are rudimentary and are based on
low-input or low-output farming, placing greater pressure on denuded land
(Pricope, Gaughan, All, Binford, & Rutina, 2015). Forest resources in the
area are generally undervalued and undermanaged, with few controls placed
on timber and ﬁrewood collection. Other natural resources such as thatching
grass and river reeds are controlled by ﬁxed-period licenses (Barnes, MacGregor,
Nhuleipo, & Muteyauli, 2010).
Economically, oﬀ-farm job opportunities in the area are limited, and the
majority of households tend to eke out maize-based subsistence existences sup-
ported by natural resource extraction (Kanapaux & Child, 2011). Cash income
in the region is mostly earned through a handful of high-paying tourism or
government jobs in the regional capital, Katima Mulilo, with a high number
of households also depending on social welfare payments such as pensions and
orphan payments (Suich, 2010).
Sikunga is rich in natural resources with grassland ﬂoodplains and Mopane
woodlands covering the 287 km2 area (Mendelsohn, 2010). The conservancy
consists of six main villages clustered in three locations. As can be seen in
Figure 1, three villages are located close to the main road into Sikunga.
Sandwiched between the only road in and out of the conservancy and the
Zambezi River, Kalimbeza, Kena, and Nasisangani have the greatest access to
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transport to the regional capital. Sifuha, the largest of all villages, and Kalundu are
a 5-km walk across the ﬂoodplains to the main road. The third region consists of
Malindi, an isolated village that can only be reached via an 18-km journey by foot
or by bike across the sandy plains. The three subareas (main road, semi-isolated, and
isolated) are able to access diﬀerent natural resources to varying extents.
Like many conservancies, Sikunga earns the majority of its income from the sale
of hunting licenses; however, there are also two lodges within the area which
support the highly lucrative angling tourism sector. The lodges have formal beneﬁt
sharing arrangements with the conservancy, and in this way, Sikunga is unique as
it earns income from hunting as well as angling. As tourism in the conservancy is
heavily focused on the unique angling in the area, the dwindling ﬁsh stocks
(Tweddle et al., 2015) are putting the lucrative tourism income, as well as the
livelihoods of the poorest and most vulnerable, at risk. In 2012, Sikunga estab-
lished a pilot ﬁsh protected area and a ﬁshery management plan, which, if success-
ful, may prove a model for future freshwater ﬁsh protected areas (Tweddle, 2012).
Data
The ESAM is primarily built from household survey data collected from within
the conservancy. There were approximately 440 households in Sikunga in 2012,
Figure 1. Map of Sikunga, its infrastructure, and villages.
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and we sampled 200 (45%). The sample was random, based on household lists
provided by the conservancy. As the sampling was nonstratiﬁed, results reﬂect
the full population of Sikunga. Targeting the household head, the survey
covered all economic activities, including the collection, consumption, and
trade of all natural resources. Agricultural inputs and outputs were also rec-
orded. For all transactions, the agent, origin, and destination of goods produced
or traded were recorded. For all ﬁsh and timber data, species were recorded so as
to better develop growth functions and measure changes in natural capital.
Secondary data sources were used to complete information gaps from the pri-
mary data. This information was used to calculate environmental stocks and
growth rates.2
Method
The SAM method was originally envisaged to observe national accounts in an
input–output table to better inform policy development (Taylor & Adelman,
1996). Acknowledging both the impact and dependence on natural resources,
the accounting framework was expanded to include the physical or ﬁnancial
values of natural resources (United Nations, 2003).
The ESAM is a speciﬁcation of the System of Environmental and Economic
Accounting (SEEA), continuously advanced to include better coverage of
Ecosystem Accounting (UNSTAT, 2016). It plays an important role in policy
planning and is critically needed as a monitoring and planning tool at the
regional and the village level (Angelsen et al., 2014; De Anguita & Wagner,
2010; Shiferaw, Freeman, & Swinton, 2005).
The Environmentally Extended Sikunga Village Sam
The ESAM (Table 1) represents the total transactions within the Sikunga
economy for a single year; it contains the links between economic activities
and changes in environmental stocks. Activity columns and rows reﬂect diﬀer-
ent production processes that produce services and goods (commodities).
Inputs, such as land, labor, and livestock, are included in Factor accounts.
Institutions—encompassing households, government, and businesses—are the
consumers of the goods and services produced or imported. Commodities pro-
duced, yet not consumed in the year, are considered increases in capital, as are
changes in savings, and are recorded in the capital accounts. Imports and
exports, as well as ﬁnancial transfers from outside the conservancy, are
accounted for in the rest of the village or Namibia or world accounts. For all
accounts, entries in the columns represent payments made, with corresponding
entries in rows reﬂecting payments received. To explore the extent to which
natural resources are being used to develop sustainable and equitable economic
growth, we hold production activities, commodities, factors of production,
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capital accounts, and households as endogenous. Exogenous accounts
are government and rest of Namibia or world. It should be noted that “A”
represents the endogenous accounts, “L” are leakage values outside the con-
servancy economy, and “X” are exogenous injections from outside Sikunga
(Agaje, 2008).
Prices have been based on market prices where possible (United Nations,
2014). In the case of forests and ﬁsh stocks, the value of the resources produced
during 2012 is based on 2012 market prices. The value of future income gener-
ated from growth and regeneration, recreational, and nonconsumptive use is
excluded. The prices of natural resources used in the production of other
goods, for instance, trees used for the production of ﬁrewood, are based on a
partitioning of the cost of labor and the end price of the produced good. This
approach is similar to the partitioning of operating surpluses between natural
and produced assets as outlined in the SEEA 20033 (UN, IMF, European
Commission, OECD, & World Bank, 2003). All values in the table are reported
in Namibian Dollars (NAD$) where NAD$1.00 is roughly PPP$0.60.
Activities. We separate the activities into four groups: agriculture, oﬀ-farm, nat-
ural resource growth, and natural resource extraction activities. Agriculture
activities focus mainly on maize and livestock and commercial rice farming.
Oﬀ-farm activities consist mainly of government and tourism services. Natural
resource growth and extraction activities are included for each individual
resource. Ecosystem services such as cultural services have been excluded from
the current version of the ESAM. Only natural resources that are economically
or environmentally signiﬁcant to the economy have been included (UN et al.,
2003). Our approach to the recording of environmental transactions is based on
the SEEA 2012 framework and on the representation of livestock developed by
Gelan, Engida, Caria, and Karugia (2012) for their Ethiopia SAM. The growth
of timber and increases in ﬁsh biomass creates the commodities timber and wild
ﬁsh, which are recorded in the submatrix A4/6. The commodities can then be
used as inputs for other production activities such as ﬁrewood harvesting or
ﬁshing. Commodities can also be taken from or contribute to existing stock
levels. This is discussed further in the following sections.
Natural resource extraction activities represent the production of goods based
on the extraction of natural resources, such as ﬁshing, ﬁrewood harvesting, and
so forth. Goods produced from natural resources which are sold are included in
submatrix A3/5 and those which are consumed directly by the household are
recorded in A3/9. Slash-and-burn farming produces agricultural assets, in the
form of farming and grazing land, and is initially recorded as a production of
the commodity farm land in A3/5, before being recorded as an increase in invest-
ment recorded in A5/10. However, this practice comes at a large environmental
cost, which is initially recorded in the value of trees lost in A3/5 and is eventually
absorbed by the conservancy in A5/9.
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As with natural resource extraction, agricultural and nonagricultural goods
produced and sold by households in Sikunga are recorded in A1/5, while the
goods they produced and consumed at home are recorded in A1/9. Cell A1/5
includes the output from the commercial rice farm run by a government-
owned business within the conservancy.
Commodities. Similar to the structure of activities, commodities are separated
into agricultural and nonagricultural goods and services, and natural resource
commodities. Commodities used as inputs for other production activities are
recorded in A5/1 and A5/2, with environmental commodities, such as trees and
wild ﬁsh, recorded in A6/3. Commodities purchased by households, regardless if
they were produced inside or outside Sikunga, are recorded in A5/9. Where
commodities were reported as being sold within Sikunga yet were not able to
be assigned to a particular institution, these values were recorded in a rest of
village account in submatrix X5/13. Submatrix X5/14 also records the value of
commodities exported to Namibia and the rest of the world.
Where the value of natural commodities used as inputs is less than the
value of the sustainable yield, an increase in natural capital is recorded in
A6/11. Similarly, increases in storages of crops or livestock headcounts are
recorded in A5/10 as an increase in agricultural capital. Thus the ESAM is
able to directly report the sustainable use of diﬀerent natural resources in dif-
ferent activities.
Factors. The Value Added matrix consists of cells A7/1, A7/2, A7/3 and A7/4, for
labour and agricultural factors, and A8/3 and A8/4 for natural resource factors.
Where residents of the community were employed outside the boundary of the
village, this is reported in A7/14. The value for labour, where possible, was based
on income reported for diﬀerent activities. For on-farm activities, labour values
were calculated based on reported time-use.
The distribution of payments to multiple factors for single activities is driven
by payments for labor. This approach is consistent with the SEEA Central
Framework 2012.4 Capital rents are recorded for livestock and land in cells
A7/1, A7/2, and A7/3 along with labor. Capital rents for environmental assets
are recorded in A8/3 and A8/4. As with physical capital, capital rents on envir-
onmental resources can only be calculated when there is no consumption of
existing capital (i.e., the use of natural resources is sustainable; United
Nations, 2014).
Institutions. Institutions consist of the government, conservancy management,
tourism operators, and households. Factor payments made to households
from agricultural capital and labor are recorded in A9/7, with factor income
from natural resources recorded in A9/8. This includes the net income from
environmental rents for the conservancy, as the conservancy controls the
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environmental resources of Sikunga. Income from government pensions or other
welfare is recorded in X9/12.
Where net savings are reported by households and other institutions, these
are recorded in A10/9. However, where net losses for agricultural and ﬁnancial
capital are noted by households, these are put in A9/10. Households within
Sikunga also sent money to households outside of the conservancy and these
transactions are recorded in X9/13 and X9/14. Transfers ﬂowing in the opposite
direction are put in L13/9 and L14/9.
We group the households by both their livelihood strategy and their geo-
graphic location. We include geographic location considering that research on
CBNRM has shown the important role of geographic capital in determining
access to natural resources (Blaikie, 2006; Kanapaux & Child, 2011). There are
four unique livelihood strategies, which we identiﬁed using a two-step cluster
analysis.5 The four groups are as follows: diversiﬁed low-input low-output rural
workers, natural resource and agricultural workers, skilled oﬀ-farm worker, and
asset and cash rich households. The four groups are then further subdivided in the
ESAM based on their geographic location: main road, semi-isolated, and isolated.
A summary of the assets and resource use of these groups is provided in Table 2.
Cluster 1 households, the largest of the four groups in terms of total house-
holds (48%), have the lowest annual income ($15,026), of which forestry
resources make up 16% of their total income. This group consumes more
than 3,100 kg of ﬁrewood per household per year; however, it tends not to
exploit ﬁsh resources.
Cluster 2 households consist of 49 households (25% of the sample) and gen-
erate most of its income from natural resources as well as unskilled employment
in agriculture sector. Households in this group catch on average around 860 kg
of ﬁsh per household per year, which accounts for more than 30% of the house-
hold’s income. They also extract the highest amounts of ﬁrewood of all liveli-
hood strategies.
Cluster 3 households have the second highest level of expenditure in the con-
servancy. Their higher expenditure is fuelled by comparatively high wage
incomes from stable government jobs, mostly in military, police, or government
departments in Katima Mulilo. This cluster represents around 15% of house-
holds in the community.
Cluster 4 households consist of 24 households, around 12% of the conser-
vancy, and achieve the highest levels of expenditure through high-paying, pri-
vate pensions as well as salaries from younger family members still residing in
the household. Despite their wealth, households in this group are the second
highest users of ﬁsh resources and cleared the second highest amounts of land
through slash-and-burn farming.
Capital. The capital accounts are used to record changes in natural, physical, and
ﬁnancial resources. Where the consumption of commodities is greater than those
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produced and imported, there must be a decrease in stocks. This decrease in
stock, referred to as consumption of existing capital, is recorded as an input to
the production activity (United Nations, 2014). In cell A11/1, we report the con-
sumption of existing natural capital. This occurs when consumption levels of
wild ﬁsh are above sustainable yield levels. Increases in agricultural capital are
distributed among the households in A10/9. Increases in natural capital are also
assigned to the conservancy in A11/9, while increases in land from slash-and-burn
farming are recorded for households in A10/9. The ﬁnancial capital account
contained in A10/9 and X10/12 is used as a balancing account and reports the
net diﬀerence between incomes and expenditures for institutions, government,
and the conservancy (Round, 2003; United Nations, 2014).
Government and conservancy. As the government and conservancy institutions
have been considered exogenous for the multiplier analysis, they must be sepa-
rated from the other institutions. However, the accounts are similar to other
institutional accounts, such as earning factor income from land via the rice farm
in L12/7 or environmental rents in L12/8.
Rest of the village, rest of Namibia, rest of the world. The rest of the village account is
used to account for the ﬂow of goods, services, and capital which are traded
without a clearly deﬁned producer or consumer. For example, a household may
have reported that it produced 100 kg of maize and sold it within Sikunga;
however, we are unable to determine which family or to which household cluster
they sold it to. To include these transactions, we therefore include it in X5/12.
Other imports from outside Sikunga are recorded in L14/5. There is a relatively
small amount of hired labor in Sikunga, with the majority of labor for livestock
herding imported from across the border in Zambia. Factor costs for imported
labor are recorded in L13/7 and L14/7.
Multiplier Analysis
The economic linkages between environmental resources and their users have
been analyzed by using constrained multiplier analysis, although most published
SAMs apply unconstrained multipliers. Unconstrained multipliers are generally
more simpliﬁed, assuming that factors and capital are unlimited and accessible
at constant costs (Breisinger, Thomas, & Thurlow, 2010). In the context of an
ESAM, this is rather idealistic and too removed from reality. For example, in
our study area, ﬁsh resources are being used unsustainably, and ﬁsh reproduc-
tion rates cannot be ramped up or down depending on short-term demand.
To better account for this, we conduct a series of constrained multiplier
analysis and place a limit on diﬀerent environment sectors and resources.
These constraints are also important in more accurately measuring the multiplier
eﬀects as unconstrained multipliers can often overestimate demand linkages
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(Breisinger et al., 2010; Round, 2003). For a more detailed description of how
the constrained multiplier is derived, see Lewis and Thorbecke (1992).
Results
The Economic Contribution of Environment- and
Nonenvironment-Based Activities to the Village Economy
The village ESAM presented in Table 3 shows aggregated household clusters
across the diﬀerent regions, as well as disaggregated environment accounts.
Gross domestic product (GDP), excluding environmental accounts, was
around NAD$3,890,000 (A13/1:A14/2) in 2012 or NAD$4,215 per capita. This
ﬁgure is below the GDP per capita of NAD$6,709 for the Zambezi region
(National Statistics Agency, 2012) and reﬂects the exclusion of income from
jobs located outside the case study’s production boundary. The GDP from
environmental accounts is worth more than NAD$22,000,000 (A13/3:A15/4)
driven by the value of forest growth within the conservancy area.
The village economy is relatively closed with few leakages. The production
value of NAD$4,197,000, excluding environmental accounts, means that GDP is
approximately 93% of total production. Despite 75% of households producing
maize, Sikunga remains a net importer. Of the roughly 84,000 kg of maize con-
sumed annually in Sikunga, 83% is imported from the regional capital.
Livestock still holds a prominent place in the culture and economy of Sikunga
and accounts for around 14% (NAD$585,000—A1/6) of nonenvironmental pro-
duction. However, expanding livestock and maize farming is responsible for the
destructive consumption of forest resources; slash-and-burn farming and land
clearing currently destroys about a third of the value of annual growth in forest
stocks. The analysis revealed that ﬁsh resources were harvested at unsustainable
rates. As can be seen in Table 3, the natural capital consumed, here the value of
unsustainable ﬁsh extraction (NAD$66,928—A23/3), is around 17% of the total
valued growth in ﬁsh stocks (NAD$375,546—A3/7).
The ESAM shows that the contribution of environment-based activities is
central to the village economy, more speciﬁcally, that the output of natural
resource extraction and harvesting is almost double that of both agriculture
and oﬀ-farm activities. Yet the distribution and utilization of natural resources
appear geared toward particular institutions and groups. This can be seen across
agriculture, oﬀ-farm, and natural resource extraction activities.
Structural Linkages Between Environmental- and
Nonenvironment-Based Activities
To explore the structural links between environment- and nonenvironment-
based activities, we look at the multiplier analysis in Table 4. Through analyzing
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the linkages with other sectors, it can be seen how natural resource-driven
growth may develop the economy, and whether growth in nonnatural resource
sectors could at the same time lead to indirect negative impacts on the natural
capital in the region. In terms of linkages between environmental and none-
nvironmental sectors, we generally ﬁnd a one-way relationship. Maize and live-
stock farming, two historically signiﬁcant sectors, have weak linkages with
extractive activities. An exogenous increase in demand for one unit of Maize
or Livestock would lead to an increase in natural resource extraction of 0.03 and
0.05 units (Table 4). Oﬀ-farm activities also indicate low linkages with extractive
sectors—as increases in tourism, conservation, and commercial services have few
knock-on eﬀects on natural resources—with output multipliers for natural
resources all below 0.17 units (Table 4). In contrast, environmental extractive
activities are strongly linked with each other. An exogenous increase in demand
for 1 unit of thatching grass and river reeds would lead to an overall increase in
1.38 units for the village economy (Table 4).
Livestock is one of the traditional livelihoods indicating a positive impact on
GDP and total income. An increase in exogenous demand for one unit of live-
stock would increase GDP by 1.02 units and income by 0.77 units. However, for
each increase in livestock demand, there is an expansion in 0.22 units of land use
through enhanced factor demand (Table 4).
The GDP and income multiplier for ﬁsh is low, as the sector is con-
strained and any increase in exogenous demand must be supplied via an
increase in imports. The ﬁshery sector has a doubly important role to play
in the economy, contributing as much to GDP directly through catching and
processing, as it does indirectly by attracting tourists for the tourism sector
(Table 4).
In looking at the services industry within Sikunga, analysis revealed that
tourism and conservation services have the largest impact on GDP. An increase
in exogenous demand for tourism and conservation would result in increases in
GDP by 1.25 and 1.23 units, respectively. As production for these two sectors
occurs largely within the conservancy, the model concludes that growth in GDP
translates into corresponding aggregate income growth. Another positive sign
for the potential of tourism and conservation services is that the two sectors have
very weak links with natural resource extraction. This is highlighted by increases
in output of 1.48 and 1.40 units, with only 9% of the growth is due to enhanced
natural resource extraction.
The Distribution of Environmental Income Across Livelihoods
and Regions
The previous section identiﬁed which sectors may support sustainable growth
and which sectors may escalate environmental degradation. To observe the
extent to which the structure of the economy will lead to equitable economic
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growth, we look at the multiplier analysis through normalized income multipliers
(Table 5). Incomemultipliers are normalized for each of the three regions and four
livelihood strategies by the weighted average for value added (Arndt, Garcia,
Tarp, & Thurlow, 2012) and by population. We include the population-based
weighted average, as value-added weights may partially reﬂect existing inequality.
The normalized multipliers show that main road households tend to gain
between 1.3 and 1.4 times the weighted average-induced income. Households
in this region gain well above the weighted average for all activities, indicating
the structural imbalance in the economy. Conversely, the isolated region with its
lack of infrastructure and limited access to markets suﬀer signiﬁcantly when
gaining from any induced income development.
The normalized multipliers for the ﬁsh and ﬁrewood sectors provide conﬂict-
ing impressions, as the sectors appear to support households that are either
extremely poor or extremely well-oﬀ. We ﬁnd that ﬁsh resources provide house-
holds from the poorest livelihood strategy (diversiﬁed low-input low-output rural
workers) with 1.19 times the weighted average (value added) for ﬁsh, while skilled
oﬀ-farm workers gain double that average income. Results are similar for ﬁsh and
ﬁrewood using the population weighted average. Reﬂecting the main road house-
holds’ access to the river and ﬂoodplains, these households beneﬁt 2.8 times more
from ﬁsh-generated income than the weighted average (value added), indicating
the highest income disparity across all normalized measures and all sectors.
The story is slightly more positive when looking at the normalized indicators
for the diﬀerent livelihoods strategies. Initially, asset and cash rich households
appear to suﬀer a disadvantage within the village economy; however, the low
normalized multipliers are slightly misleading. The majority of income for this
cluster is generated by income from outside the conservancy, either from high-
return pensions or salaries outside Sikunga. In consequence, any increase in
induced demand within the village economy is unlikely to have any impact on
their production and thus income-generating activities.
The poorest group of households, diversiﬁed low-input low-output rural
workers, beneﬁt from induced demand for commodities produced from unskilled
activities such as maize and livestock farming as well as natural resource extrac-
tion. This partly reﬂects that their production and consumption activities are
driven within the village. On the other hand, households in this cluster gain little
from conservation and tourism activities. Increases from conservation employ-
ment or tourism are likely to ﬂow through to the wealthy and well-educated
skilled oﬀ-farm workers.
Discussion
CBNRM is a local governance institution that aims to deliver locally adapted
sustainable and equitable rural development (Dressler et al., 2010; Fabricius
et al., 2013; Sowman & Wyberg, 2014). Our ESAM analysis shows that
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beneﬁt-sharing matters. This is in line with recent research done by Mosimane
and Silva (2015), who found that local governance institutions in Namibian
conservancies have not yet developed fair, transparent, and accountable bene-
ﬁt-sharing systems facilitating participation. In a behavioral ﬁeld experiment
related to our ESAM analysis, Roettgers (2016) revealed the signiﬁcance of
institutions favoring cooperation, speciﬁcally prosocial norms, leadership, and
communication.
The structural linkages between environmental and nonenvironmental activ-
ities identiﬁed in our study area indicate that the natural resource-based sectors
within the CBNRM economy are strongly interconnected, while nonnatural
resource-based sectors appear to be growing separately and somewhat discon-
nected. The ESAM analysis shows that the current structure of Sikunga’s econ-
omy is neither sustainable nor equitable. Natural capital is being consumed at
unsustainable rates with minimal consideration over the long-term economic
and ecological consequences and may lead to regime shifts with damaging eco-
nomic and environmental impacts.
However, Sikunga is an emerging conservancy with high potential for diver-
sifying the nature-based tourism sector due to its rich aquatic and terrestrial
biodiversity. Being part of a broader network that includes also transboundary
natural resource management approaches (Abbott et al., 2007), the process of
community development depends on external factors, local management strate-
gies (Fabricius et al., 2013, p. 273), and the collaboration between traditional
leadership, government, and external stakeholders (Mawere, Mabeza, & Shava,
2014). As pointed out by Barendse, Roux, Currie, Wilson, and Fabricius (2016),
one limiting external factor is the government’s inadequate implementation cap-
acity so that local governance institutions have narrow capacity to develop nat-
ural resource stewardship. This holds for wildlife as well as for ﬁshery
management (Cox, Wilson, & Pavlovich, 2016; Lewins et al., 2014; Ngwira,
Kolawole, & Mbaiwa, 2013; Nkhata, Breen, & Abacar, 2009; Nunan, 2006;
Sutton & Rudd, 2014).
The ESAM tool has highlighted negative developments, associated with
investments by the Sikunga Conservancy Management, that appear to advantage
established elites and wealthy households and those located near the main infra-
structure. In particular, the isolated village of Malindi has no clear economic
development opportunities based on the current structure of Sikunga’s economy.
More concerning, however, is that income multipliers indicate conservancy-based
economic activities such as tourism and conservation jobs are skewed to be
prorich rather than propoor, ﬁndings similar to that of Elliot and Sumba
(2011), who recommended the launch of transparent beneﬁt-sharing agreements.
Geographical clustering shows the opportunity to reconsider land manage-
ment and zooning in favor of remote villages. We also show that biased income
allocation in favor of asset-rich households causes an unsustainable increase in
demand for cattle and grazing land, explained by the cultural high value local
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people still attribute to owning cattle. As the Zambezi region is already at max-
imum carrying capacity (Mendelsohn, 2006, 2010; Pricope et al., 2015), any
increase in farming land will be due to land-use change. As deforestation inten-
siﬁes, the growth rate of forest stocks will decrease, which in turn may escalate
pressure on households due to loss of fuel sources, shade, protection from
desertiﬁcation, and other ecosystem services.
Value-added sectors such as community-based tourism may increase capital
rents on the natural resources without putting at risk natural capital stock levels
(Van der Duim, Lamers, & van Wijk, 2015). Conservation tourism as promoted
by the African Wildlife Foundation is one promising example for market-based
conservation that might be an option for Sikunga (Van Wijk, van der Duim,
Lamers, & Sumba, 2014).
Conclusion
This article contributes to existing research in several ways. It is an addition to
the limited number of village-level SAM and ESAMs and provides a valuable
insight into the economic and environmental linkages within a CBNRM context.
By including subvillages within the ESAM, our model highlights the importance
of geographic capital, particularly in the context of a region undergoing rural–
urban change. Finally, the model also challenges the cultural importance of
particular livelihood activities, and their future role in the livelihood strategies
of rural households in northeastern Namibia.
The result indicates that the CBNRM program in Sikunga so far has done
little to enhance sustainable and equitable development; rather, the transfer of
property rights to the conservancy has allowed the elite and wealthy households
to extract greater rents on the natural resources and put at risk the natural
capital. The lack of incentives for the vulnerable isolated households to protect
the wildlife plains that surround them could eventually jeopardize the wildlife
and the hunting-based income that the governing committee members have
grown to depend on.
To enhance economic development, the ConservancyManagement Committee
may consider prioritizing conservancy employment opportunities for disadvan-
taged households such as stewards for the wildlife plains or other similar activities.
Methodologically, the assumptions behind the multiplier analysis place some
limitations on our conclusions and suggest that future research considers not only
the greater use of village-level ESAMs across a wider number of study areas but
their use as an input into more village-level computable equilibrium and agent-
based models as well. Furthermore, ESAMs are only able to incorporate the ﬂows
and changes in stocks of natural resources and services. While concentrated ﬂows
of goods and services may indicate particular power balances within a community,
they are insuﬃcient to explain why diﬀerent groups may be marginalized and the
broader political ecology. Second, the quantiﬁcation of both the volume and the
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value of ecosystem services is a key input into ESAMs, and there are many natural
resources and ecosystem services, particularly cultural services, which though dif-
ﬁcult are worth quantifying and valuing in this context.
The Sikunga Conservancy is unique in many ways. First, while the majority
of the income for the conservancy management committee is obtained from the
sale of hunting licenses, like most conservancies, however, its current tourism
income is ﬁshing and not based on wildlife. Second, it is also a comparatively
young conservancy, which means that historical and cultural factors may inﬂu-
ence the results reported within the CBNRM context.
Our results make a valuable contribution to the debate methodologically and,
with a wider application, may enhance the distribution of direct and indirect
beneﬁts within the CBNRM context.
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Notes
1. In the literature, the term CBNRM is often used in the broader context of natural
resources management or management of the commons, including wildlife, fish, forest,
and water resources, involving some degree of comanagement between the government
and communities (Roe et al., 2009; Turner, 2004). In our article, we apply this broader
definition of CBNRM.
2. Secondary sources used to calculate fish growth rates were Hay et al. (2002) and
Downing and Plante (1993). Secondary sources used to calculate tree growth were
Barnes et al. (2010), Kamwi (2003), and Laamanen, Otsub, and Tubalele (2002).
3. See page 51 of the SEEA 2003 for more details.
4. For more information, see section V Asset Accounts (United Nations, 2014, p. 153).
5. Two-step cluster analysis is a subjective way to group the households into groups with
common mixes of livelihood strategies using both categorical and continuous vari-
ables. It is preferred to hierarchical techniques due to its ability to integrate categorical
and continuous variables and its ability to group clusters based on the objective AIC
and BIC indicators (Mooi & Sarstedt, 2011). Cluster analysis is commonly used in
livelihood strategy analysis. For more information regarding the use of cluster analysis
in identifying livelihood strategies, see Brown, Stephens, Ouma, Murithi, and Barrett
(2006).
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